Presents a set-theoretic version of the analysis of "there be" as predicating instantiation of a property, a property-theoretic version of which was developed in McNally 1992. This paper provides a solution to the criticism that McNally 1992's analysis could not account for sentences in which postverbal nominal contains a monotone decreasing or nonmonotonic determiner.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS IN THE THOUGHT OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS A REVALENT VIEW of St. Thomas Aquinas's position on the logic of propositions has been that according to him propositions of the :form, x is, hold a privileged place, that they are in a special sense " existential," and that such propositions straight.forwardly attribute the act of exi,stence to an individual or to a class of individuals.1 Some (...) texts seem to support such an interpretation. For example, in his commentary on Aristotle's Perihermeneias, Aquinas says: " To clarify this we must note that the verb 'is ' itself is sometimes predicated in an enunciation, as in ' Socrates is.' By this we intend to signify that Socrates really is." 2 This passage seems to treat the predicate " exists " or " is " as unproblematical, as though it had a straightforward meaning needing little clarification, at least in the context of a logical treatise. On the basis of such a text, one may be tempted to infer that for Aquinas " Socrates exists " has the same logical form as " Socrates sits," and that " Men exist " is of the same form as " Men are mortal.'' Peter Geach has shown, however, that Aquinas's doctrine here is not as simple as it may first appear. For Aquin,as some of the propositions which have the grammatical form of x is have 'a different logical form.3 Geach points out that for Aquinas the sentence, "Blindness exists," for example, actual1 E.g., Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), 190-215. 2 Super Peri, Bk. II, lect. 2, # 212. Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. II, ch. 37 at "FJ11J hoc..•." a Peter Geach, in P. T. Geach and G. E. M. Anscombe, Three Philosophers (New York: Cornell University, 1961), 88 ff; Peter Geach, "Form and Existence," in Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. Kenny (New York: Notre Dame U., 1969), pp. 41-47. 605 606 PATRICK LEE ly means, Something or other is blind. That is, blind is the real predicate rather than exists. Mo11eover, Geach argues, the logical peculiarity of this sentence is equally found in any sentence of the form, "an F exists." Such a proposition, " does not,attribute actuality (existence) to an F, but F-ness to something or other..." 4 And yet Geach will not apply rthis interpretation to all sentences of the form, " x is." He al'lgues that sentences in which " is " or " exists " is. joined to a logically pl'oper name are in a different category. Unlike in general propositions such as "an F exists," in such singular propositions, those using logically proper names, Geach,argues, actual existence is attributed to or predicated of an individual. "We have here a sense of 'is ' or 'exists ' that seems to me to be certainly a genuine predicate of individuals: the sense of ' exists ' in which one says that an individual came to exist, still exists, no longer exists, etc...."5 I believe that, while Geach's position is more accurate than the first interpretation, mentioned above, it is nevertheless still inaccurate on certain key points. While it is misleading to say that for Aquinas exists is never a genuine predicate; nevertheless, I will argue that it is his position that exists or existence is not a genuine predicate in any proposition which does not refer back to a previous proposition (or to what is known in or by previous propositional knowledge). Let us crull a proposition which refers to something known in a previous proposition a " second-order p11oposition," and one that does not thus refer a " first-order proposition." Then, I shall argue that for Aquinas exists is not a genuine predicate in any first-order proposition. Moreover, I believe that these points are crucial to understanding Aquinas's position on existence as well as his position on how knowledge is related,to reality, i.e., his realism. In this article I would like to examine Aquinas's thought on the logic of existential propositions and discuss its significance for epistemology. 4 Geach, " Form and Existence," Zoo. int., p. 45. 5 Ibid., p. 46. EXISTENTIAL PROPOSITIONS IN AQUINAS 607 In sections... (shrink)

We present various results regarding the decidability of certain sets of sentences by Simple Type Theory. First, we introduce the notion of decreasing sentence, and prove that the set of decreasing sentences is undecidable by Simple Type Theory with infinitely many zero-type elements ; a result that follows directly from the fact that every sentence is equivalent to a decreasing sentence. We then establish two different positive decidability results for a weak subtheory of math formula. Namely, the decidability (...) of math formula and math formula. Finally, we present some consequences for the set of existential-universal sentences. All the above results have direct implications for Quine's theory of “New Foundations” and its weak subtheory math formula. (shrink)

‘Quantified pure existentials’ are sentences (e.g., ‘Some things do not exist’) which meet these conditions: (i) the verb EXIST is contained in, and is, apart from quantificational BE, the only full (as against auxiliary) verb in the sentence; (ii) no (other) logical predicate features in the sentence; (iii) no name or other sub-sentential referring expression features in the sentence; (iv) the sentence contains a quantifier that is not an occurrence of EXIST. Colin McGinn and Rod Girle have alleged that (...) standard first-order logic cannot adequately deal with some such existentials. The article defends the view that it can. (shrink)

In 2001, Le Bars proved that there exists an existential monadic second-order sentence such that the probability that it is true on [Formula: see text] does not converge and conjectured that, for EMSO sentences with two first-order variables, the zero–one law holds. In this paper, we prove that the conjecture fails for [Formula: see text], and give new examples of sentences with fewer variables without convergence.

This book contains an original analysis of the existential there-sentence from a philosophical-linguistic perspective. At its core is the claim that there-sentences' form is distinct from that of ordinary subject–predicate sentences, and that this fundamental difference explains the construction's unusual grammatical and discourse properties.

We analyze the behaviour of declarations of independence between existential quantifiers in quantifier prefixes of Independence-Friendly (IF) sentences; we give a syntactical criterion to decide whether a sentence beginning with such prefix exists, such that its truth values may be affected by removal of the declaration of independence. We extend the result also to equilibrium semantics values for undetermined IF sentences.

Paradigmatic uses of negative existentials such as ‘Vulcan does not exist’ are problematic because they present the interpreter with a pragmatic paradox: a speaker who uses such a sentence seems to be asserting something that is incompatible with what she presupposes. An adequate solution must therefore explain why we interpret paradigmatic uses of negative existentials as saying something true, even though such uses present us with a pragmatic paradox. I provide such an explanation by analyzing paradigmatic uses of negative existentials (...) as corrections of previous assertions that are judged to suffer from referential presupposition failure. I present the explanation within the framework of a simple version of segmented discourse representation theory. (shrink)

As epigraph to his engrossing book of “clinical stories,” Creatures of a Day, dealing with the great varieties of the fear of death and the forms its overcoming takes, Irving Yalom, a psychiatrist with deep philosophical sympathies, stitches together the following sentences taken from various places in the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius: “All of us are creatures of a day; the rememberer and the remembered alike. All is ephemeral—both memory and the object of memory. The time is at hand (...) when you will have forgotten everything; and the time is at hand when all will have forgotten you. Always reflect that soon you will be no one, and nowhere”.1 These sentences were composed by Marcus... (shrink)

This paper offers a new semantic theory of existentials (sentences of the form There be NP pivot XP coda ) in which pivots are (second order) predicates and codas are modifiers. The theory retains the analysis of pivots as denoting generalized quantifiers (Barwise and Cooper 1981; Keenan 1987), but departs from previous analyses in analyzing codas as contextual modifiers on a par with temporal/locative frame adverbials. Existing analyses universally assume that pivots are arguments of some predicate, and that codas (...) are main or secondary predicates. It is shown that these analyses cannot account for the behavior of codas with quantifiers and for the interaction of multiple codas, both of which receive a simple treatment on the proposed theory. The assimilation of codas to frame adverbials explains several semantic properties which have not been analyzed in the semantic literature, and that distinguish existentials from their copular counterparts. Furthermore, it highlights important properties of the semantics of modification and its relation to predication. (shrink)

We prove an existential version of Gaifman's locality theorem and show how it can be applied algorithmically to evaluate existential first-order sentences in finite structures.

In [GK], Gurevich and Kokorin proved that any two non-trivial ordered abelian groups (o-groups, for short) satisfy the same existential sentences. Let nowG, H be non-trivialo-groups with a commono-subgroupG 0. We determine whetherG andH are existentially equivalent overG 0. As a corollary, we obtain algebraic criteria for deciding, whether ano-subgroupG is existentially closed in ano-groupH. Corresponding results are proved foro-groups in which congruences are regarded as atomic relations.

In The Theory of Objects, Alexius Meinong used true negative existentials to argue in favour of non-existent objects: in order to assert veridically that an object O does not exist, one has to refer to O itself1. From Bertrand Russell's "On Denoting" onwards, it has become a commonplace to say that this argument does not work. For every sentence apparently concerning non-existents one can provide a paraphrase which eliminates the singular term contained in it and therefore dispels the illusion of (...) a reference to a non-existent item2. As is well known, this strategy implies that such a singular term is a camouflaged definite description. However, Saul Kripke and other supporters of the so-called new theory of reference have claimed that singular terms directly referring to their designation (ordinary proper names, indexicals, mass and substance terms: from now on, DR terms) are not at all synonymous with descriptions. In their opinion, true negative existentials represent no exception to this claim. In what follows I would like to stress that, though Kripke's critique of the Russellian treatment of negative existentials is convincing, his treatment of true negative existentials containing a DR term is flawed. Nor do other contemporary accounts that share Kripke's critique as far as these sentences are concerned fare any better. In fact, I think that Meinong's argument may be correct where true negative existentials containing DR terms are concerned. But I shall aim to demonstrate this elsewhere. (shrink)

We show that the 0-1 law does not hold for the class Σ 1 1 (∀∃∀ without =) by finding a sentence in this class which almost surely expresses parity. We also show that every recursive real in the unit interval is the asymptotic probability of a sentence in this class. This expands a result by Lidia Tendera, who in 1994 proved that every rational number in the unit interval is the asymptotic probability of a sentence in the class Σ (...) 1 1 ∀∃∀ with equality. (shrink)

1. Ramsey Sentences and the Function of Theoretical Concepts. In his famous paper “Theories,” Frank Ramsey introduced a technique of examining a scientific theory by means of certain propositions, dubbed later “Ramsey Sentences.” They are the results of what is often called Ramsey elimination. This prima facie elimination is often presented as a method of dispensing with theoretical concepts in scientific theorizing. The idea is this: Assume that we are given a finitely axiomatized scientific theorywhere O1, O2, … (...) are the primitive observation terms of and H1, H2, … its primitive theoretical terms. For simplicity, it will be assumed that is a first-order theory. Since it is finitely axiomatizable, we may think of it as having the form of a single complex proposition, i.e., the conjunction of all the axioms. What can then be done is to generalize existentially with respect to. The result is a sentence of the formIn, the theoretical terms H1, H2, … do not occur any longer. They have been replaced by the variables X1, X2, … bound to initial existential quantifiers. In this sense at least, Ramsey sentences do effect on elimination. Unlike, is not a first-order sentence but a second-order one. (shrink)

In uttering negative existential sentences, we do not mention but use an empty singular term. A pretense account explains the use in terms of pretense. I argue that our understanding of negative existential statements can be successfully explained by Crimmins’ theory of shallow pretense if it is supplemented and reconstructed properly. First, I explain the notion of shallow pretense and supplement Crimmin’s theory with an Evansian account that we immediately grasp the phenomenology of what is pretended without (...) a conscious effort to imagine the condition under which what is pretended can be true. Thus, shallow pretense does not consist in the counterintuitive meta-representation of the fact of pretense. Second, against the objection to Crimmins’ distinction between utterance truth-condition and modal content that it is ad hoc, I argue that there is good reason to hold the distinction for the semantics of belief reports. Finally, I argue that the distinction has a merit of explaining our intuition about the epistemic possibility associated with our use of an empty singular term. (shrink)

This paper discusses the semantics of bare existentials , i.e. existentials in which nothing follows the post copular NP (e.g. There are four sections ). While it has sometimes been recognized that the interpretation of such sentences depends in some way on context, the exact nature of the context dependence involved has not been properly understood. It is shown that the meaning of bare existentials involves a set-denoting implicit argument, and that the range of interpretations found with bare existentials (...) is predictable from the general properties of implicit arguments. An explicit analysis within a dynamic setting is presented. (shrink)

In his earlier essay in aesthetics--after lengthily disposing of a number of Aristotelian-Thomist distinctions between the speculative order and the practical order, between the "useful" arts and the "fine" arts, and so on--M. Maritain, in the most interesting passages of Art and Scholasticism, concerned himself with this astonishing "growth of self-consciousness" in the modern artist. And what chiefly occupied him was the thought that, in submitting to the idea of making art out of the idea of art, the artist might (...) become so fascinated with technique and so estranged from the existential world of nature and the universe of man that he should forget that, unlike God, he cannot create ex nihilo. He wanted, then, to confront him with the futility of claiming any kind of aseity for his art, for pure art, he said, "involves nothing, the subject being completely whittled away. I call that a sin of idealism in relation to the matter of art: pushed to the extreme, a perfect building, with nothing to build." The idea of making poetry out of the idea of poetry or painting out of the idea of painting can, in other words, never yield anything but sterility, since the kind of "metaphysical vastness" that characterizes greatness in the arts has always been a result of vital transactions between the creative Self and the universes of Being. And for the poet or the painter to seek to allay the kind of "eucharistic passion" that arises at the very center of the artistic process is for him to run the risk of suicide, since it is for him to isolate his art from everything that is not "its own peculiar rules of operation." There is one long and wonderful sentence in which the lesson is summed up, as M. Maritain says that he would remind modern art that. (shrink)

Let T be a complete first-order theory over a finite relational language which is axiomatized by universal and existential sentences. It is shown that T is almost trivial in the sense that the universe of any model of T can be written $F \overset{\cdot}{\cup} I_1 \overset{\cdot}{\cup} I_2 \overset{\cdot}{\cup} \cdots \overset{\cdot}{\cup} I_n$ , where F is finite and I 1 , I 2 ,...,I n are mutually indiscernible over F. Some results about complete theories with ∃∀-axioms over a finite (...) relational language are also mentioned. (shrink)

In this paper I am concerned with an analysis of negative existential sentences that contain proper names only by using negative or neutral free logic. I will compare different versions of neutral free logic with the standard system of negative free logic (Burge, Sainsbury) and aim to defend my version of neutral free logic that I have labeled non-standard neutral free logic.

The problem of negative existentials arises because utterances of such sentences have the paradoxical feature of denying what they presuppose, thus undermining their own truth. There are only two general strategies for solving the problem within the constraints traditional static semantics, and both strategies attempt to explain away this paradoxical feature. I argue that both strategies are fundamentally flawed, and that an adequate account of negative existentials must countenance, and not explain away, this paradoxical feature. Moreover, I argue that (...) a framework of dynamic semantics can achieve this result. Thus negative existentials provide a case in support of dynamic semantics. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to graded model theory, in the context of mathematical fuzzy logic. We study characterizations of classes of graded structures in terms of the syntactic form of their first-order axiomatization. We focus on classes given by universal and universal-existential sentences. In particular, we prove two amalgamation results using the technique of diagrams in the setting of structures valued on a finite MTL-algebra, from which analogues of the Łoś–Tarski and the Chang–Łoś–Suszko preservation theorems follow.

Previous theorists have claimed that Russell’s theory of definite descriptions gives the wrong truth conditions to sentences in which definite descriptions are embedded under certain other operators; but the other operators used, such as conditionals and propositional attitude verbs, have introduced intensional and hyperintensional complications that might be thought to obscure the point against Russell. This paper shows that the same kind of problem arises when the operator in question allows the context to be extensional. It is further argued (...) that presuppositional theories of definite descriptions give intuitively satisfying analyses of the novel data. (shrink)

Contemporary logicians continue to address problems associated with the existential import of categorical propositions. One notable problem concerns invalid instances of subalternation in the case of a universal proposition with an empty subject term. To remedy problems, logicians restrict first-order predicate logics to exclude such terms. Examining the historical origins of contemporary discussions reveals that logicians continue to make various category mistakes. We now believe that no proposition per se has existential import as commonly understood and thus it (...) is unnecessary to restrict first-order predicate logics to non-empty classes. After introducing the problem, we trace some nineteenth century treatments of the issue to locate a source of misconstruing propositional import in misconceptions of ‘implies’ and ‘affirms’ and name the process/product fallacy, along with the translation of categorical sentences using quantifiers and accommodating an empty class. Next we treat some metalogical matters to orient our discussion by which we provide a more precise nomenclature about ‘sentence’ and ‘proposition’ to correct previous misconceptions; here we uncover a common category mistake in respect of a proposition’s efficacy. The semantic distinction between agent and force is helpful in this connection. We conclude by showing that logicians have reinserted existence as a predicate, a position previously excised by Kant, and that the Frege-Russell ambiguity thesis applies only to relationships within a categorical sentence between grammatical predicate and subject. (shrink)

The languages of finitary and infinitary logic over the alphabet of bounded lattices have proven to be of considerable use in the study of compacta. Significant among the sentences of these languages are the ones that are base free, those whose truth is unchanged when we move among the lattice bases of a compactum. In this paper we define syntactically the expansive sentences, and show each of them to be base free. We also show that many well-known properties (...) of compacta may be expressed using expansive sentences; and that any property so expressible is closed under inverse limits and co-existential images. As a byproduct, we conclude that co-existential images of pseudo-arcs are pseudo-arcs. This is of interest because the corresponding statement for confluent maps is still open, and co-existential maps are often—but not always—confluent. (shrink)

An assertion is existentially known if and only if: (i) the speaker knows that the sentence she uses to make the assertion expresses a true proposition; (ii) she makes the assertion based on that knowledge; and (iii) she does not believe, have justification for, or know the proposition asserted. Accordingly, if existentially known assertions could be made correctly—as argued by Charlie Pelling in his ‘Assertion and the Provision of Knowledge’—this would show that the norm of assertion cannot be the speaker's (...) belief in, justification for or knowledge of the proposition. In this paper, I try to show that Pelling's argument is inconclusive, as it rests on two assumptions which can be resisted. In turn, I offer a pair of alternative strategies to explain how we can deal with existentially known assertions under the assumption that the speaker's knowledge is the norm of assertion. (shrink)

Dummett defines a ‘predicate’ as that which combines with one or more singular terms to form a sentence. His account of ‘singular term’ is syntactical, involving three necessary conditions. He discusses a fourth, ‘Aristotelian’, criterion before propounding a criterion of predicate quantification which he claims to be superior to it. He tentatively proposes that the three necessary conditions plus the criterion of predicate quantification yield sufficient conditions for being a singular term. I show that Dummett’s necessary conditions fail with regard (...) to referentially opaque contexts, negative existentials and wide-scope negations, and that he overlooks an important class of predicative expressions that satisfy his three supposedly necessary conditions for singular terms, namely, those that may appear either as adjectives or as nouns. I argue that Dummett cannot use the ‘Aristotelian’ criterion without circularity; and that, in any case, the ‘Aristotelian’ criterion fails dramatically. I also show that his criterion of predicate quantification fails with regard to expressions for colours. I end by casting doubts on the adequacy of any purely syntactical approach. (shrink)

Serious actualists take it that all properties are existence entailing. I present a simple puzzle about sentence tokens which seems to show that serious actualism is false. I then consider the most promising response to the puzzle. This is the idea that the serious actualist should take ordinary property-talk to contain an implicit existential presupposition. I argue that this approach does not work: it fails to generalise appropriately to all sentence types and tokens. In particular, it fails to capture (...) the right distinctions we ought to make between what I call _typographical sentence types_—an interesting and previously undiscussed class of fine-grained sentence types which are partially individuated by their typography, or how they look when written out. (shrink)

Some theories assume that sentences like (i) with a presupposition trigger in the scope of a quantifier carry an existential presupposition, as in (ii); others assume that they carry a universal presupposition, as in (iii). No student knows that he is lucky. Existential presupposition: At least one student is lucky.Universal presupposition: Every student is lucky. This work is an experimental investigation of this issue in French. Native speakers were recruited to evaluate the robustness of the inference from (...) (i) to (iii). The main result is that presuppositions triggered from the scope of the quantifier aucun‘no’ are in fact universal. But the present results also suggest that the presuppositions triggered from the scope of other quantifiers depend on the quantifier. This calls for important changes in the main theories of presupposition projection. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of the notational difference between Beta Existential Graphs, the graphical notation for quantificational logic invented by Charles S. Peirce at the end of the 19th century, and the ordinary notation of first-order logic. Peirce thought his graphs to be “more diagrammatic” than equivalently expressive languages for quantificational logic. The reason of this, he claimed, is that less room is afforded in Existential Graphs than in equivalently expressive languages for different ways of representing the (...) same fact. The reason of this, in turn, is that Existential Graphs are a non-linear, occurrence-referential notation. As a non-linear notation, each graph corresponds to a class of logically equivalent but syntactically distinct sentences of the ordinary notation of first-order logic that are obtained by permuting those elements that in the graphs lie in the same area. As an occurrence-referential notation, each Beta graph corresponds to a class of logically equivalent but syntactically distinct sentences of the ordinary notation of first-order logic in which the identity of reference of two or more variables is asserted. In brief, Peirce’s graphs are more diagrammatic than the linear, type-referential notation of first-order logic because the function that translates the latter to the graphs does not define isomorphism between the two notations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:29. CONTRARIETY AND CAUSALITY IN HUME Hume's notion of contrariety ranks among the most obscure in his theory of relations. To make matters worse, the puzzling account of contrariety he offers can be shown inconsistent in the following way. The Treatise (T69-82) divides all relations into two disjoint classes - one class containing relations of knowledge (in the strict sense) ascertained by the mere comparison of ideas, the other (...) containing those of probability or 'uncertain knowledge' requiring 'experience' or empirical evidence. Causality is the paradigm of a probability relation - contrariety falls into the class of knowledge relations. Thus unlike causality the discovery of a contrary relation appears to require no experience. Yet in direct contradiction Hume claims that with the exception of existence and non-existence (which are singled out for special attention), all knowledge of contrary relations demands experience: no two ideas are in themselves contrary, except those of existence and non-existence.... All other objects, such as fire and water, heat, and cold, are only found to be contrary from experience, and from the contrariety of their 'causes ' or effects '. (T15) The charge of inconsistency appears inevitable. However, I shall argue that Hume escapes by implicitly operating with two distinct concepts of contrariety: one (which I shall term "logical contrariety") a relation of knowledge, the other (to be called "empirical contrariety") reducible to a peculiar type of causal relation, and therefore a probability relation. To adduce independent grounds for this claim I demonstrate that acceptance of these two concepts is essential if we are to explain why Hume finds 2 it important to place the following restriction on contra- 30. riety (hereafter, R): properly speaking no objects are contrary to each other, but existence an (y exists). And (4) can hardly be said to represent a form of contrariety between existent and non-existent objects. (Indeed paradox of material implication aside, (4) is an analysis of "x causes y".) Therefore to hold R and still maintain some sense of contrariety between existent and non-existent objects, Hume must restrict contrariety to logical contrariety. 32. Hume's own remarks bear out my claim. In the Treatise he recognizes that restricting contrariety to existence and non-existence means treating it as contradiction : the flattest of all contradictions... (is)... that 'tis possible for the same thing both to be and not to be. (T19, my emphasis.)... with contrariety... No one can once doubt but existence and non-existence destroy each other, and are perfectly incompatible and contrary. (T70) And in the Enquiries he interchanges the terms 'contrary' and 'negation' : The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible ; because it can never imply a contradiction... (EU25)... No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. (EU164) This usage indicates that if? is (logically) contrary to q,? is -q, the negation of q. In this case the conjunction of? and q spells the contradiction (q & -q). The definition of logical contrariety we adopt is the same as the definition of contradiction specialized to existential sentences, so we need not state it. It is sufficient to give as a paradigm the following contradiction: (5)(Mars exists) & - (Mars exists). Here it is the existence of Mars that is logically contrary to the non-existence of Mars and therefore the contrariety restriction R is satisfied. Again it is only the existence and non-existence of the same object that is logically contrary. Empirical contrariety is most clearly defined in terms of the Lewis counterfactual G=>, where 1O' is a monadic predicate, 'e.' and 'e.' represent distinct arbitrary events, and "0(e)" means "event e occurs": 33. 5 Here it is not the existence and non-existence or occurrence (EC) e. is empirically contrary to e. iff 0(e.) D=> ~0(e.)." and non-occurrence of distinct events that gives rise to contrariety. Rather it is the existence or occurrence of one event that is empirically contrary to the existence or occurrence of another. To establish Hume's motivation for framing the condition R in such a way as to identify contrariety with contradiction, I now turn to examine the epistemological ground of the difference between empirical and logical contrariety. The ontological distinction between empirical... (shrink)

In the dissertation we study the complexity of generalized quantifiers in natural language. Our perspective is interdisciplinary: we combine philosophical insights with theoretical computer science, experimental cognitive science and linguistic theories. -/- In Chapter 1 we argue for identifying a part of meaning, the so-called referential meaning (model-checking), with algorithms. Moreover, we discuss the influence of computational complexity theory on cognitive tasks. We give some arguments to treat as cognitively tractable only those problems which can be computed in polynomial time. (...) Additionally, we suggest that plausible semantic theories of the everyday fragment of natural language can be formulated in the existential fragment of second-order logic. -/- In Chapter 2 we give an overview of the basic notions of generalized quantifier theory, computability theory, and descriptive complexity theory. -/- In Chapter 3 we prove that PTIME quantifiers are closed under iteration, cumulation and resumption. Next, we discuss the NP-completeness of branching quantifiers. Finally, we show that some Ramsey quantifiers define NP-complete classes of finite models while others stay in PTIME. We also give a sufficient condition for a Ramsey quantifier to be computable in polynomial time. -/- In Chapter 4 we investigate the computational complexity of polyadic lifts expressing various readings of reciprocal sentences with quantified antecedents. We show a dichotomy between these readings: the strong reciprocal reading can create NP-complete constructions, while the weak and the intermediate reciprocal readings do not. Additionally, we argue that this difference should be acknowledged in the Strong Meaning hypothesis. -/- In Chapter 5 we study the definability and complexity of the type-shifting approach to collective quantification in natural language. We show that under reasonable complexity assumptions it is not general enough to cover the semantics of all collective quantifiers in natural language. The type-shifting approach cannot lead outside second-order logic and arguably some collective quantifiers are not expressible in second-order logic. As a result, we argue that algebraic (many-sorted) formalisms dealing with collectivity are more plausible than the type-shifting approach. Moreover, we suggest that some collective quantifiers might not be realized in everyday language due to their high computational complexity. Additionally, we introduce the so-called second-order generalized quantifiers to the study of collective semantics. -/- In Chapter 6 we study the statement known as Hintikka's thesis: that the semantics of sentences like ``Most boys and most girls hate each other'' is not expressible by linear formulae and one needs to use branching quantification. We discuss possible readings of such sentences and come to the conclusion that they are expressible by linear formulae, as opposed to what Hintikka states. Next, we propose empirical evidence confirming our theoretical predictions that these sentences are sometimes interpreted by people as having the conjunctional reading. -/- In Chapter 7 we discuss a computational semantics for monadic quantifiers in natural language. We recall that it can be expressed in terms of finite-state and push-down automata. Then we present and criticize the neurological research building on this model. The discussion leads to a new experimental set-up which provides empirical evidence confirming the complexity predictions of the computational model. We show that the differences in reaction time needed for comprehension of sentences with monadic quantifiers are consistent with the complexity differences predicted by the model. -/- In Chapter 8 we discuss some general open questions and possible directions for future research, e.g., using different measures of complexity, involving game-theory and so on. -/- In general, our research explores, from different perspectives, the advantages of identifying meaning with algorithms and applying computational complexity analysis to semantic issues. It shows the fruitfulness of such an abstract computational approach for linguistics and cognitive science. (shrink)

In Shona , bare plurals and bare singulars seem to have different scope possibilities with respect to a class of modifiers which I term “scopeless quantity words” few’, and ose ‘all’). I argue that this is due to two factors. First, the scopeless quantity words are intersective modifiers rather than quantifying determiners, so that DPs containing them denote entities rather than generalised quantifiers. Second, transitive sentences involving plural arguments are usually interpreted using the **-operator, which gives a cumulative reading; (...) the apparent wide and narrow scope readings of bare plurals are both subcases of this reading, but a narrow scope reading for bare singulars cannot be subsumed by the cumulative reading. I also discuss the scope behaviour of a quantifying determiner, oga-oga ‘every’, which shows a subject/object asymmetry: in subject position, it appears to show the expected scopal ambiguity, but in object position, it appears to have the same readings as a scopeless quantity word; I argue that this is because of the location of existential closure. This adds to the evidence suggesting that many words giving quantity are intersective modifiers rather than quantifying determiners or adverbial quantifiers. (shrink)

According to Thomasson’s Easy Ontology, all existential questions have straightforward answers and are solvable by conceptual and empirical work. So there is no need for traditional metaphysics to solve them. First, I give some counterexamples to this thesis from incomplete and undecidable theories. Then I discuss some possible responses, I consider a wider sense of conceptual analysis and argue that even in this sense Easy ontology is not able to resolve the problem and must sacrifice either easiness or answerability. (...) Finally, I will argue that although traditional metaphysics does not make the undecidable sentences answerable, it can still make sense of them and helps us to understand why there are unanswerable questions at all. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception - a canonical text of twentieth-century philosophy - concludes with an appeal to 'heroism' by citing a series of enigmatic sentences drawn from Saint-Exupe;ry's Pilote de guerre. Surprisingly, however, these lines are antithetical to the philosophical thrust of Merleau-Ponty's project. This book aims to explain this situation. Foregrounding liminal themes in Merleau-Ponty's thought that have been largely overlooked - e.g., sacrifice, death, myth, faith - and showing how these themes support Merleau-Ponty's reinterpretation of Husserlian phenomenology, (...) Smyth shows that Merleau-Ponty's appeal to 'heroism' represents an extra-philosophical appeal to a historical purposiveness as a universal feature of human nature, and that Merleau-Ponty makes this appeal in virtue of his recognition of the intrinsic methodological limitations of philosophy as a theoretical endeavor. The book thus recovers the 'militant' dimension of Merleau-Ponty's thought. This sheds considerable new light on his work. It does so in a way that challenges some of the basic parameters of existing Merleau-Ponty scholarship by illuminating the intrinsic normativity of his existential phenomenology, and its epistemic reliance on forms of non-reason such as faith and myth. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a grammatical account of scalar implicatures. In particular, I submit new evidence in favor of the contextual blindness principle, assumed in recent versions of the grammatical account. I argue that mismatching scalar implicatures can be generated even when the restrictor of the universal quantifier in a universal alternative is contextually known to be empty. The crucial evidence consists of a hitherto unnoticed oddness asymmetry between formally analogous existential sentences with reference failure NPs. I (...) conclude that the generation of mismatching scalar implicatures does not require contextual access. (shrink)

Whatever one may think of Schmidt’s intuition, it is still nothing but intuition, and the variety of syntactic structures which εἶναι admits of is neither articulated nor unified. Kahn, on the other hand, by the use of Transformational Grammar, is able to a large extent to generate in a regular way from a posited notion of "kernel sentence" all the Greek sentences in which εἶναι occurs. Kahn’s original plan was "to correlate every intuitive difference of meaning in the use (...) of εἰμί with a formal description of the corresponding sentence-type", but he admits that he cannot always do so. Whether this is a failure inherent in Transformational Grammar itself, or in the version Kahn uses, can for the moment be left aside. First, an example of the success and another of the failure of the technique, as Kahn practices it, are in order. Kahn formulates the rule for the recognition of periphrasis somewhat as follows: εἶναι is used periphrastically with the participle if and only if it is impossible to obtain two kernel sentences, one of which has a finite form of εἶναι and the other a finite form of the participle, but if two kernel sentences can be so obtained, the usage is not periphrastic. This rule is both simple and elegant; it will no doubt become in time a standard part of Greek grammar. The enchantment, however, which mathematical clarity can cast is best illustrated in the case of another construction. ἔστιν ὅστις... is not uncommon. It looks like the existential operator of modern logic, and the fact that it occurs far more often with οὐκ than without seems to be, linguistically, irrelevant. Now, Kahn asserts that, though he looked hard for examples, he could only find one in which the second clause has the copula, and he offers a proof as to why this should be the case. He is mistaken. Euripides has οὐκ ἔστι θνητῶν ὅστις ἕστ’ ἐλεύθερος, and Sophocles καὶ οὐδὲν τούτων ὅ τι μὴ Ζεύς, and there are several examples in just one passage of Plato’s Charmides. The Sophoclean example is important since it illustrates a double "zeroing" of εἶναι, and whereas for traditional grammar such nominal sentences are treated as primary, with the insertion of ἐστί as a secondary development, in Kahn’s use of Transformational Grammar no distinction between the presence or the absence of the verb can be allowed. For deep structure, the verb is always present, and it might be no more than an apparent paradox that a verb, whose primitive meaning is said to designate presence, can in its absence make its presence equally felt. Can a verb which is almost always eliminable be the word for reality and truth? Or is it because "being" is the only word that cannot be just a word that it can so easily be suppressed in speech? (shrink)

F. P. Ramsey pointed out in Theories that the observational content of a theory expressed partly in non-observational terms is retained in the sentence resulting from existentially generalizing the conjunction of all sentences of the theory with respect to all nonobservational terms. Such terms are thus avoidable in principle, but only at the cost of forming a single "monolithic" sentence. This paper suggests that communication may be thought of as occurring not only by sentence but by clause, a sentential (...) formula closed except for a special kind of variable. Understanding such clauses requires incorporating them within the scope of one's own Ramsey sentence. Many concepts of deductive and inductive logic carry over without great change. But the concepts of truth and designation are extendible to clauses only in the sense that assertions involving them must, to be understood, in turn be construed as clauses and incorporated into the Ramsey sentence. The behavior of these extended concepts of truth and designation suggests an explication of coherence truth within a correspondence-truth framework. (shrink)

Resumen En esta nota presento la teoría unificada de las oraciones copulativas propuesta por Andrea Moro, quien sostiene que el verbo ser no es más que un soporte para la flexión verbal, independientemente de las peculiaridades gramaticales y semánticas de las oraciones adscriptivas, identificativas y existenciales en que aparece. Primero contextualizo la propuesta de Moro; después explico la manera en que Moro aclara una anomalía sintáctica que parece corroborar la supuesta polisemia del verbo ser. Por último, comento algunas omisiones de (...) relevancia filosófica en la historia del verbo ser contada por Moro.In this note I present the unified theory of copular sentences proposed by Andrea Moro, who maintains that the verb to be is nothing more than a support for verbal inflection, regardless of the grammatical and semantic peculiarities of the ascriptive, equative, and existential sentences in which it appears. First, I contextualize Moro's proposal. Then, I explain how Moro clarifies a syntactic anomaly that seems to corroborate the alleged polysemy of the verb to be. Lastly, I comment on some omissions of philosophical relevance in the history of the verb to be told by Moro. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Correspondence Theory of Truth is not well- served by Truthmaker Theory and is better developed in a different direction. For there are reasons to believe that the main axiom of that theory (TA) which states that for every truth there is a truthmaker is either unjustified or false. Some of these reasons are already well-known. Negative existentials and universal generalizations present initial difficulties for TM theory as do necessary truths. There is a more serious problem, (...) though which has not hitherto been noticed. (TA) even when restricted to contingent sentences seems to tolerate clear counterexamples. There seem to be, and I argue that there in fact are, true contingent sentences which lack truthmakers. The examples adduced are all truthmaker analogues of semantically pathological sentences. The positive proposal shares with Truthmaker Theory the view that our judgments and sentences are rendered true by the worldly facts but argues for an alternative conception of Ôrendering trueÕ and a novel conception of 'facts'. (shrink)

The problem concerns quantifiers that seem to hover between universal and existential readings. I argue that they are neither, but a different quantifier that has features of each. NOTE the published paper has a mistake. I have corrected this in the version on this site. A correction note will appear in Analysis.

This chapter discusses the conceptual orbitings of individuals corresponding to lists of noun phrases formed with ‘or’. We should resist the precept that a set-theoretic union must be contrived for every occurrence of ‘or’ in favour of some discourse-theoretical account that codifies the work that ‘or’ does in the punctuation of speech. A succession of sentences composed with ‘or’ is replaced by a succession of forms containing non-assertive occurrences of those sentences either composed with ‘and’ or as separate (...) acts of speech. The discussion of the behaviour of ‘or’ may be taken up in intensional environments where Quine left the subject of the opacity of certain verbs. The degree of particularity of the intentions is reflected in the particularity with which the dative pronoun will permit existential generalization. (shrink)

At the end of ‘The Age of the World Picture,’ Heidegger offers a brief sentence, ‘Keiner stirbt für blosse Werte’ (No one dies for mere values.). This sentence underscores one of the central themes of Heidegger’s later essays, the nihilism that results from living in an economy of value. This way of life is lived by a certain kind of human being, one who treats a culture’s embedded habits and practices as value systems to be exploited and exhausted. A more (...) difficult problem presents itself: what is it like to be a person who has mastered this economy of value? This paper sets out to examine this question, and to propose another perspective: no one dies for mere values, but how does Heidegger’s rendition of the Übermensch manage to live? How does one live for mere values? I argue that Heidegger’s technological examples (e.g., the hydroelectric plant) have two salient features: each is ‘infectious’ and ‘exhaustible,’ features that are not consonant with the appropriative use of our habits and practices. I will focus on the condition Heidegger describes, and the person who makes this condition manifest, and conclude with a proposal for a ‘Nietzschean corrective.’. (shrink)

This paper uses a declarative mapping sentence approach to explore and amend design thinking - a project development and management technique recently disseminated in Africa. We contend that there are problems in the manner in which design thinking has been exported to Africa, namely, that design thinking is rooted in the linear, binary, human-centric systems present in Western philosophy and that the exportation of design thinking is potentially neo-colonial. We, therefore, attempt to ameliorate these difficulties by decoupling design thinking from (...) its Western philosophical perspectives. We will also seek to broaden the understanding of design thinking by adopting the more communitarian perspective found in philosophy that has been developed in Africa. The amended form of design thinking we present considers the user’s existential paradigms and facilitates a flexible and reflexive process void of deliberate finality. Furthermore, we claim that amending design thinking’s philosophical foundations to incorporate a communitarian perspective has the potential to make design thinking more ecologically-centric. (shrink)

First published in 1997, this book addresses the question: What is the interpretation of English there-existential construction? One of the principal goals is to develop an interpretation for the construction that will specifically address other properties of the postcopular DP. After outlining the problem, the author goes on to present a syntactic motivation for the claim that the postcopular DP is the sole complement to the existential predicate, as well as for the claim that the optional final phrase (...) is a predictive adjunct. In chapter 3 the interpretation for the basic existential construction is developed and then compared to analyses that take the postcopular DP to denote an ordinary individual or a generalised quantifier of individuals. This analysis is then augmented to account for the contribution of the final XP and shows how the predicate restriction can be derived from a more general condition on depictive/circumstantial VP-adjuncts. The final chapter contain some speculative discussion of the broader implications of the proposal in the context of data such as "list" existential and "presentational-there" sentences. (shrink)